PROGRESS OF THE LAW.

As MARKED BY DECIsIONs SELECTED FROM TIE ADVANCE
REPORTS.

ACCUMULATIONS.

In Codinanv. Brighamn, 72 N. E. ioo8, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts holds that where a will directed
that a fund should be held and accumulated for
Charities
twenty-five years before it should be actually
used for the relief of suffering, such provision was valid
even though the accumulations might extend beyond the
times prescribed in the rule against perpetuities, the accumulation being directed in favor of a charity. Compare St.
Paul'sChurch v. Attorney-Gcncral, 164 Mass. 188.

ADJOINING LANDOWNERS.

In Cotton v. Huston, 84 S. W. 97, the cattle of one of two
adjoining landowners broke through the fence between them
Fences:
and did damage to the corn of the other. He
Cattle Drench thereupon detained the cattle in order to secure
reparation for the injury inflicted, anti the owner of the
cattle brought an action for such detention. It is held that
although the duty was imposed on him to keep the fence in
repair, so that the cattle should not break through, nevertheless his neighbor had no right to retain such cattle until
he compensated him for the damages. The old rule about
distraining cattle damage feasant seems to be disappearing.
Compare O'Rielky v. Diss, 41 Mo. Ap. 484.
The Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. i, holds
in Gerst v. City of St. Louis Ct al., 84 S. NV. 34, that where
Ltcrnl
one of two adjoining landowners intends to
support
make an excavation on his property it is his
duty to inform his neighbor of such fact and of the extent
to which he proposes to excavate and to give him time to
protect himself against such excavation, and failure to do
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ADJOINING LANDOWNERS (Continued).

this will subject him to liability for excavation on his own
property, resulting in damage to his neighbor, unless such
neighbor had knowledge of his intention and an actual
opportunity to protect himself.
ALTERATIONS.

In Messi ct al. v. Frechede, 37 S. 6oo, the Supreme Court
of Louisiana decides that the burden of proof rests upon a
Burden of
party relying upon a written instrument to
Proof
account satisfactorily for any interlineation
which operates a substantial change in the effect of such
instrument. It will be remembered that the rules in England
and in some of the states in this country have taken a different view. See Stephen on Evidence, Article 89.
ASSAULT.

In McNeil v. Mullin, 79 Pac. 168, the Supreme Court of
Kansas decides that if the conduct of the parties to a mutual
combat constitutes a breach of the criminal law,
Consent to
Fight
the consent of either one to participate in the
m~l~e does not deprive him of his civil remedy against the
other, and each contestant may recover from the other all
damages resulting from the injuries he received in the fight.
Compare Willey v. Carpenter,23 Atl. 630.
BAILEES.

The interesting question arises as to whether a storage
company which, in carrying on its business, transports the
goods for storage to and from its warehouse and
Storsge and
MovIng
Company

also engages in moving such goods for its
patrons from one part of a city to another is a

common carrier. This question is involved in the case of
Jaminet v. Anerican Storage and Moving Co., 84 S. W. 128,
where the St. Louis Court of Appeals, Missouri, holds that
under the facts of the case such company was not a common
carrier but assumed only the liability of a bailee for hire. The
case is decided on another ground, but this apparently being
as yet still an unsettled question, the decision will no doubt
be of significance in the future.
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BANKRUPTCY.

In Biela v. Urbanczyk, 85 S. XV. 451, the Court of Civil
Appeals of Texas decides that a demand for damages for
breach of marriage promise and seduction is a
Breach of
in bankruptcy proceedings,
demand provable
Marriage
though the damages are unliquidated. Compare
Promise
Baily v. GIcason, 56 AtI. 537.

BREACH OF MARRIAGE PROMISE.

The Code of Tennessee provides that a second marriage
cannot be contracted before the dissolution of the first, but
for
that the first shall be regarded as dissolved
Contract wh
five
has beentoabsent
if either party
a Married such purposenot
living.
be
other
the
to
known
years and is
Woman
79, it appeared that a man had
W.
S.
85
In Johnson v. Iss,
made a contract to marry a married woman whose husband
had disappeared less than five years after his disappearance.
It is held by the Supreme Court of the state that such promise
was immoral and afforded no predicate for damages for a
breach, though it was understood that the marriage should
not take place until the five years elapsed or a divorce should
be obtained by the woman.

CARRIERS.

The questions which arise as to the liability of a.carrier to
a passenger for goods of the passenger of which he retains
partial or exclusive possession are involved in
pass.nsere
E-f.cet
much difficulty and the cases can by no means
be regarded as establishing a satisfactory and well-settled
rule. A new decision upon this point occurs in Hart v.
North Gcrman Lloyd S. S. Co., 92 N. Y. Supp. 338, where
the property in question was taken from the cabin of a passenger. The property consisted of shirt studs, and they had
been left in the shirt, which had been hung in his cabin. The
New York Supreme Court, Appellate Term, decides that
the carrier's liability was that of an insurer in the absence of
negligence on the part of the passenger. One judge, however, dissents. See also Adams v. N. J. Steamboat Co., 151
N. Y. 163, 34 L. R. A. 68z.
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The recent decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
in Hughes v. PcninsyhaniaR. R. Co., 202 Pa. 222, in which
Limitation of the court held that, though the Pennsylvania
Liability
rule is well settled that a carrier may not limit
his liability for negligence, this rule will not be applied
where the contract of carriage is made and the negligent act
occurs in some jurisdiction whose laws permit such limitation, is already bearing fruit. Thus in Cappel v. Weir, 92
N. Y. Supp. 365, it appeared that an express company made
a contract in Pennsylvania to carry a certain package to New
York, but failed after its arrival in New York to deliver it
to the consignee. The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Term, decides that, in view of the decision in Pennsylvania referred to, a clause in the contract limiting the liability
to fifty dollars, being valid in New York, would be there
*enforced where the breach of the contract occurred in a
jurisdiction permitting the limitation.
It is decided by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky in
Hancock v. Louisille and N. R. Co., 85 S. W. 210, that a
passenger purchasing a ticket for transportation
Stopping
to a station on the carrier's line contracts to take
Through
his passage on a train scheduled to stop at that
Trains
point, and he cannot, on boarding a train not scheduled to stop
there, compel the conductor to accept the ticket, -or recover
damages for being ejected from the train. Compare Flood
v. C. and 0. Ry. Co., go S. W. 184.

CONFLICT OF LAWS.

In Howardv. Western Union Tel. Co., 84 S. W. 764, it is
decided by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky that where a
Dnnvery of contract for the transmission and delivery of a
TCIgms
telegram was made in West Virginia, hut was to
be consummated by delivery in Kentucky, and the negligence complained of consisted of delay in delivery occurring
mainly in Kentucky, the contract was governed by the laws
of that state. One judge dissents.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

In Ames v.Kirby, 59 Atd. 558,the-Supreme Court of New
Jersey decides that a statute prohibiting the keeping of a
place within the state to which persons might
Interstate
commerce

resort for pool-selling or book-making or for

betting upon the event of any horse-race, either within or
without the state, or for gambling in any form, or aiding,
abetting, or assisting therein, is violated by the keepi'g of a
resort for gamblers whose wagers are made by means of telegraphic communication with persons outside of the state, and
though this is so, the statute is not in conflict with the interstate commerce clause of the Federal Constitution, though
the section incidentally operates to prevent interstate wagers
by telegraph. Compare Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pendleton, 122 U. S. 347.
In Bazemore v. State, 49 S. E. 699, the Supreme Court of
Georgia decides that under the police power laws may be
passed for regulating common occupations
Police
Power
which, from their nature, afford peculiar opportunity for imposition and fraud. Applying this principle, it
is decided that because of its value, the ease with which it
is taken from the field, and the difficulty of detecting the
thief, the state may regulate the sale of seed cotton, and fix
a punishment upon the person who buys in violation of the
terms of the statute. Compare Turner v. Maryland, 1O7
U. S. 41.
In United States Exp. Co. v. State, 73 N. E. ioi, the
Supreme Court of Indiana decides that a statute of the state
requiring express companies to deliver parcels to
Due Process
of Law
the consignee in cities having a specified popuiation is not a dcpri.ation of liberty or property without due
process of law within the inhibition of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution.
CORPORATIONS.

The Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey discusses with great thoroughness and in a very satisfactory
manner the questions connected with voting
voting
rtets
trusts in the case of Warren v. Pint, 59 AtI.
773. It is thcre held that an irrevocable "voting trust," or
any other irrevocable grant, uncoupled with an interest in
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the stock to be voted upon, assuming to confer upon the
donee the power to vote at stockholders' meetings for the
choice of directors, is contrary to the letter and also to the
spirit and policy of the general corporation act of New Jersey (P. L. 1896, page 277). One of the judges in rendering his opinion declares that in New Jersey the validity of
a voting trust depends upon two considerations, first, that
the holders of all the shares of the corporation shall have an
equal privilege (after fair information) of availing themselves of the trust agreement; and, second, that the object
and aim of the trust shall be the equal benefit of all the
shares. There is a dissenting opinion and the whole case
is well worthy of study. On the question of whether the
votirig trust litigated was contrary to public policy the court
divides almost evenly, seven judges against six holding it
contrary to public policy.

CRIMINAL LAW.

The constitutional law of Missouri provides that if any
person shall, under or by promise of marriage, seduce an
Seduction:
unmarried female of good repute, under twentyMinority
one years of age, he shall be deemed guilty of a
felony. In applying this statute the Supreme Court of the
State holds in State v. Brock, 85 S. W. 595, that, in a prosecution under such section, it was no defence that defendant
at the time he made the promise to marry was under tventyone years of age, and therefore could not have made a promise of marriage enforceable against him.

DEAD BODIES.

In Koerber v. Patek, i02 N. W. 40, -the Supreme Court
of Wisconsin decides that where there is no surviving spouse
Mutiation: a son is the lawful custodian of the body of a
Who M y sue deceased parent for preservation and burial and

is entitled to an action for an unlawful mutilation of the
body. In such action damages are alowed for the sense of
outraged and mental suffering resulting directly from the
wilful mutilation of the body of plaintiffs deceased mother.
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DEEDS.

In Sanford v. Recd, 85 S. W. 213, it appeared that a
woman conveyed land in order to get it out of her hands in
Cancellation: case recovery should be had on a bond on which
Fraud
she was surety. It is held by the Court of
Appeals of Kentucky that notwithstanding this fact she is
entitled to have the deed cancelled where the grantees' attorney took advantage of her weakness to induce her to make
the conveyance without consideration by frightening her as
to her liability on the bond, and promising to reconvey vhen
the matter of the bond was out of the road. Compare
Ander'son's Adm'r v. Merideth, 82 Ky. 571.
The Court of Civil Appeals of Texas decides in Medearis
v. Granbcrry,84 S. W. 1o7o, that where parents executed a
deed in consequence of threats of the grantee to
Validity:
Duress
prosecute their son, a criminal, such deed may be
avoided on the ground of duress. See io Am. and Eng.
Ency. Law (2d ed.), 33 o , and cases there cited.

EVIDENCE.

The Court of Appeals of Kentucky in LouiszVlle and
N. R. Co. v. Smith, 84 S. W. 755, lays down the general
statements rule that where the physical or mental suffering
as to Phystof a person resulting from an injury is the proper
cal Condition
subject of inquiry the usual expression of such
suffering manifested or made at the time may be admitted as
original evidence. Compare Bacon v. Charlton, 7 Cush. 586.
There is also an interesting decision as to elements of
danaige, the court deciding that it is inadmissible to prove
a dream which is alleged to have caused the injured person
pain and suffering even though the dream seems without
question to have been the result of the injury and to have
caused the injured person distress naturally resulting from
a disagreeable dream. This decision no doubt will commend
itself, but it is interesting as dealing with a matter seldom
appearing in legal decisions.

I
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HIGHWAYS.
In Cumberland Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Avritt,
85 S. W. 204, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky decides that
the building of a telephone line on a public highsevItud
way imposes no additional servitude." This is
an extension of the Kentucky doctrine that a steam railroad
or an electric railway built on a highway does not constitute
additional servitude.
INTERSTATE COMMERCE
In Southern Ry. Co. v. Greenboro Ice and Coal Co., 134
Fed. 82, the United States Circuit Court (E. D. North CaroStat*
lina) decides that an order of a state corporation
CommISS1*0
commission directing a railroad company to
place cars on a certain track for unloading, as requested by
the consignee, is without jurisdiction and void vhen it
affects cars loaded with coal shipped from one state into
another.
These it is held remain subjects of interstate
commerce for the purposes of the case until delivered to the
consignee, and consequently cannot be brought within an
order such as was promulgated here.
It is also held in the same case that a suit against such
state corporation commission to enjoin the enforcement of
such order is not a suit against the state, and is within the
jurisdiction of a Federal court. On this point see note to
Tindall v. Wesley, 13 C. C. A. 165.
LARCENY.
The Supreme Court of Nebraska decides in Junod v.
State, io2 N. W. 462, that wire fastened to posts for the
What
purpose of fencing a part of the public domain,
Co
6ttut s

for temporary use as a summer pasture for live

stock, is personal property; and one who cuts or tears it from
the posts and carries it away with larcenous intent, without
the consent of the owner, may be convicted of larceny. Compare Jackson v. State, i i Ohio State, io4.
LIFE INSURANCE.
In Supreme.Lodge K. P. v. Brad ey, 83 S. W. io55, the
Supreme Court of Arkansas deals with the provision found
"in most life insurance policies excepting the
Dtath In
viol.tion at
death in consequence of the violation of any
1:W
criminal law, and it is held with two judges dissenting that a death received, while retreating
from a personal difficulty, not for the purpose of gaining
vantage ground to renew the strife, even though the encounter
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is begun by an assault by the deceased on his slayer With a
weapon capable 6f inflicting great bodily harm or death
according to its use, but for the purpose of protecting himself,
is not a death within the meaning of such clause exempting
the company from liability for a death in the way aforesaid.
Compare Bloom v. FranklinLife Ins. Co., 97 Ind. 478.

LOTTERY.

The Supreme Court of Georgia decides in De Florin v.
State, 49 S. E. 699, that a "suit club," whose members pay
to a tailor one dollar per week, and which holds
What Con.
. stitate
weekly drawings, as a result of which the member holding the lucky number receives from the tailor a suit
of clothes, and then ceases to be a member of the club, is a
scheme in the nature of a lottery. This is so although an
unlucky member who continues to pay his one dollar weekly
for thirty weeks is entitled to a thirty-dollar suit of clothes
regardless of the result of the drawings. Compare Meyer v.
State, 112 Ga. 20.
MARRIAGE.
In Boehs v. Hanger,59 Atl. 904, the Court of Chancery of
New Jersey decides that the jurisdiction of the Court of
Chancery to decree the annulment of a marriage
Annalmet
on the ground of fraud is confined to cases of
fraud which affect the essentials of marriage, and will not be
exercised if a decree of annulment will violate public policy.
Applying this principle, it is held that where a man induced
a woman to believe that he was not a divorced person, though
in fact he was, the misrepresentation did not affect the
essentials of marriage and did not constitute ground for its
annulment, although the woman was a member of a church,
one of the tenets of which is that marriage cannot be dissolved except by the death of one of the contracting parties,
and that a marriage with a divorced person, the other party
to the divorce being still living, is invalid, and cohabitation
therein is sin. Such marriage is not, however, in violation
of the law of the land and Will be upheld.
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MORTGAGES.

In Gibson v. Thomas, 73 N. E. 484, it appeared that an
owner of a farm subject to a mortgage conveyed a right of
way through the farm to a railroad company,
Priorities
which entered under the deed and operated a
railroad thereon. The owner of the mortgage, holding by
assignment from the mortgagee, which had been recorded,
executed a release to the mortgagor of the land conveyed
to the railroad, which release was given to the railroad company, but was not recorded. Under these facts the Court of
Appeals of New York decides that a subsequent purchaser
of the mortgage, with no knowledge of the existence of the
release, and not knowing that the railroad ran through the
farm, was protected under the recording act in his lien on
the entire premises. Three judges, however, dissent.
PARENT AND CHILD.

In Roller v. Roller, 79 Pac. 788, the Supreme Court of
Washington holds that a child cannot in a civil action recover
Clvn Liabilltyof Pnrcnt
to Child

against a parent for a tort done by the parent
to the child, though the offence is rape and the
offending parent has been criminally convicted

therefor. In answei to the argument that under the circumstances the reason of the rule fails in view of the fact that the
harmony of the domestic relations has already been so seriously broken as not to be much further impaired by such suit,
the court replies that there could then be no practical line of
demarcation drawn and the interests of other minor children
might suffer. See also Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703,
13 L. R. A. 682.
The question as to the effect of a contract entered into by
a parent with regard to the custody of his child upon his
legal right to such custody is one upon which
custoey
there seems to be some uncertainty. This question is presented to the Supreme Court of Washington in
Carey v. Hertel, 79 Pac. 482, where it is held that though
a father, upon the death of his wife, placed his infant daughter in the care of the parents of the child's mother, under an
agreement to pay them for their services, agreeing to allow
her to live with them until she was six year.s of age, he may
nevertheless recover the care and custody of his daughter
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(before the child has arrived at the age of six years) where
he is a proper person to be intrusted with such custody. In
this case she was but three years of age when she was
awarded to the custody of her father. Compare Lovell v.
House of the Good Shepherd, 9 Wash. 419.

PLEADING.

In an action for damages against a railway company by
reason of the ejection from one of its trains of a person
claiming the rights of a passenger, the petition
Different
appeared to be framed on the theory that a right
Causes of
of recovery rested in tort for the wrongful act of
Action
the conductor in expelling plaintiff from the train. The petition, however, contained allegations of fact sufficient to show
that the railway company violated its contract of carriage
entered into with the plaintiff, which averments the evidence
tended to sustain. The railway company did not demur to
the petition for misjoinder of causes of action, nor move to
strike from it irrelevant and redundant matter, but answered.
Under these facts the Supreme Court of Kansas decides in
Chase v. Atchison, T. and S. F. Ry. Co., 79 Pac. 153, that it
was error to sustain a demurrer to plaintiff's evidence. This
interesting decision is particularly worthy of study in connection with the carefully considered cases of Superzisors of
Kewaunee Co. v. Decker, 30 Wis. 624, 34 Wis. 378.

PRACTICE.

In Platner Implenzent Co. v. InternationalHanvester Co.
of America, 133 Fed. 376, the United States Circuit Court
Dec1sions of of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, decides that the variFder-t Jud1:ges
ous judges who sit in the same court should not
attempt to overrule the decisions of one another, especially
upon questions involving rules of property and practice,
except for the most cogent reasons.
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RAILROADS.

Difficult questions arise in connection with the right of a
conductor to insist on compliance by a passenger with the
Compiance

vwith Terms

of Ticket

terms of his ticket, where such compliance has

been rendered impossible or represented as
immaterial by some other employee of the carrier.

New decisions are always occurring. Two recent ones appear,
one in Ft. Worth and R. G. Ry. Co. v..1oiws, 85 S. W. 37,
and the other in Texas and P. Ry. Co. v. Strith, 84 S. W.
852, both by the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. In the
former of these cases it is decided that where a round trip
ticket required that it should be stamped at the point of
destination in order to entitle the passenger to his return
trip, it must nevertheless be accepted by a conductor if the
agent of the company at the point of destination refuses to
stamp and sign the ticket according to its provisions. One
judge dissents. In the latter case the court holds that
though a railroad ticket agent assures a passenger who had
lost her ticket that the conductor would make it all right
and she could travel without it, the conductor was neverthe,
less justified in ejecting her when she failed to produce either
her ticket or her fare for her transportation. These apparently different results are reached, it seems, on the ground
that in the former case the act of the ticket agent in refusing
to sign and stamp the ticket was within the scope of his
authority while the act of the agent in the latter case was not.

RULE IN SHELLEY'S CASE.

With two judges dissenting the Supreme Court of Iowa
decides in Doyle v. Andis, 1o2 N. W. 177, that the rule in
Shelley's case is a part of the common law of
Iowa
Iowa. The opinion of the court is a most excellent and elaborate discussion of the rule both from the historical standpoint and from the standpoint of public policy.
The criticism made by the dissenting judge of the rule and
of the majority opinion is very keen and incisive, and the
whole decision is well worthy of study andwill undoubtedly
prove a leading case upon this branch of the law.
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SEDUCTION.

Cases in which some recognition is given to the existence
of the hypnotic power are comparatively infrequent, and are
Artinces:
of consequent interest and importance. In a
DeInc
recent decision by the Supreme Court of Iowa,
State v. Donovan, io2 N. W. 791, the possible exercise of
this power in accomplishing the seduction of a woman is
recognized, the court holding that evidence tending to show
a continuation of flattery, -love-making, and hypnotism in
order to gain possession of the person of the prosecutrix
was a sufficient predicate for a prosecution for seduction.
See note to People v. Ebanks, 40 L. R. A. 269.
It is further decided that the fact that the defendant in
the prosecution was married at the time of the alleged artifices constitutes no defence.
WILLS.
In Merrillv. Webster, 73 N. E. 672, the contest arose over
a will which devised all of the testatrix's property to her
Conzrsctoea: husband in fee and then provided in the folloWTrmst
ing clause: " It is my will, in consideration of
the fact that I have heirs who are worthy, that my said husband shall leave by his will after my decease . . . the
property, of whatever kind, to my heirs.' The Supreme
Court of Massachusetts, construing this language, holds that
it does not create a trust in the husband for the benefit of
the testatrix's heirs, but is repugnant to the former grant
of the fee to the husband, and his interest cannot, therefore,
be cut down to a life estate. Compare Bassett v. Nickerson,
184 Mass. i69.
WITNESSES.

A very interesting decision, and one. which may prove an
important precedent, appears in Freasierv. State, 84 S. W.
.,
36o. The constitution of Texas provides that
,fCbaL~rc
all oaths shall be taken subject to the pains and
penalties of perjury. A section of the penal code provides
that no person shall be convicted of an offence committed
before he was nine years old. It is held that under these
two provisions a child under the age of nine years cannot be
a witness. One judge dissents, and the situation is regarded
by the judges who rendered judgment so serious that they
suggest to the legislature the need of remedial legislation.
Compare Kenney v. Steic, 7 . W. 877, 65 L.R. A. 316.

